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Abstract
This study reconsiders the interest rate rule for the Russian monetary policy, of which no
evidence was found in earlier studies. This study successfully estimates an interest rate rule. In
order to obtain this result, we follow Surico (2007)ʼs nonlinear approach.
The main contributions of this study are as follows. Our empirical results indicate that the
Russian monetary policy follows a nonlinear interest rate rule. Further, we clarify the
preference of the monetary policy in subsample estimation. When the 1998 ﬁnancial crisis is
considered, Russiaʼs preference for output expansion is evident. According to Surico, this
increases inﬂation in Russia.
Key Words: nonlinear rule; asymmetric objective; Bankof Russia
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E58, P51
I. Introduction
Price and output stability are the main goals of central banks all over the world. On the
basis of this fact, the traditional social loss function has been expressed as a quadratic equation











where pt,p − is the inﬂation deviation and yt is the output gap.
Woodford (2003) provided a micro-foundation for this loss function; loss function (1) can
be generated as a second-order approximation of the agentʼs utility function. Furthermore, this
assumption yields the Taylor rule̶the most famous interest rate rule (see Taylor (1993) and
Svensson (1997)).
Although the quadratic loss function (and the Taylor rule) has a rigid theoretical
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＊ I am grateful to Masahiko Yoshii, Ryuzo Miyao, Seiichi Fujita, and Kentaro Iwatsubo of Kobe university for their
helpful comments and suggestions.background, this assumption does not seem to apt for Russia since earlier studies have rejected
the notion that the Russian monetary policy follows the Taylor rule; Esanov et al. (2005)
estimated the Taylor-type rules and concluded that these did not apply in Russia.
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Vdovichenko (2006) used the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation and
concluded that the Taylor rule does not apply to Russia. These rejections raise the questions
regarding the validity of assumption (1) in Russia.
In order to address this question and estimate an alternative interest rate rule, this paper
follows Surico (2007)ʼs approach: Surico (2007) employed the linex loss function instead of (1)
and estimated the nonlinear interest rate rules in the United States. The linex loss function is
not quadratic but origin asymmetric with regard to output and/or inﬂa t i o n ,w h i c hd e p e n do nt h e
monetary policy preference. We examine the nonlinear interest rate rule as a candidate for the
Russian monetary policy rule.
This paper proceeds as follows. The nonlinear rule is introduced and estimated in section
II, where we ﬁnd that the nonlinear rule describes the Russian monetary policy very well. In
section III, a more detailed analysis of the Russian monetary policy is implemented using the
subsample estimation through which, we obtain a robust preference of the Russian monetary
policy. Section IV oﬀers the concluding remarks.
II. Nonlinearity in the Russian Monetary Policy
1. Nonlinear Rule
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce the nonlinear rule provided by Surico (2007). For
details of the nonlinear interest rate rules, see Surico (2003, 2007) and Ruge-Murcia (2003).















In this case, the parameters, a and g represent the preference with regard to inﬂation and
output gap, respectively. The asymmetric parameters determine the shape of the loss function
(so-called asymmetric parameters), for example, see Figure 1. The central banker with a loss
function as in Figure 1 dislikes output expansion more than the one with a quadratic loss
function.
In addition, assume the dynamic systems are as follows:
yt=byt+1,f(it,pt)+et+1, (3)
pt=qpt+1+Vyt+ηt+1. (4)
These systems are based on the optimization of the representative agent. Equation (4) is called
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) and (3) is called the Dynamic IS curve (DIS).
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McCallum (1988)).On minimizing (2) and taking these systems and expectations of agents as given, we get
















The asymmetric parameters a and g are reconstructed as 2c4/c2 and 2c5/c3, respectively.
2. Evidence of the Nonlinear Rule
The nonlinear interest rate rule has not been previously estimated for Russia. In addition,
No report shows that the interest rate rule can serve as the Central Bankof Russia (CBR) ʼs
monetary policy rule. This section provides the evidence for the nonlinear interest rate rule in
Russia.
The samples are as follows:
・Reﬁnancing rate: CBR
・Consumer price index (CPI): Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
(WIIW)
・Production index (PI): WIIW
・Real exchange rate: CBR
We use monthly data covering the period from 1997:1 to 2007:7 due to data availability. The
CPI and PI are seasonally adjusted using the Census X12 program. The inﬂation rate is the
annual percentage change in the monthly CPI. The output gap is deﬁned as the deviation of
(log) production from its natural rate. We use the linear trend estimated by the Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter as the natural rate of production.
We estimate the nonlinear rule using GMM because there seems to be a correlation
between the error term and the regressors.
3 Instrument variables for GMM are selected from
the observable information sets for the central bank. The instruments are as follows: three lags
of unemployment, three lags of construction production, three lags of imports to the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), three lags of government deposit, two lags of M2,
one-lag of loan rate, one-lag of real exchange rate, and lags of regressors. The Newey-West
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix is used to eliminate
the serial correlation in the error term.
Table 1 reports the GMM estimates of the interest rate rule (5) and asymmetric parameters
a and g.A l lc o e ﬃcients are strongly signiﬁcant. Simultaneously, we also explore the
robustness of our baseline model. All the output gaps are exchanged with the unemployment
rate, keeping instruments unchanged.
4 Even after real variables are changed, the nonlinear
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2 The NKPC determines inﬂation given a path for the output gap, whereas the DIS equation determines the output
gap given a path for the (exogenous) natural rate and the actual real rate (Gali, 2008, pp.49).
3 In this case, the error term is deﬁned as the prediction error of the central banker (see Surico (2007) and Clarida,
Gali and Gertler (2000)).relationship is replicated. On the basis of these results, the nonlinear rule seems to explain the
Russian monetary policy behavior. However, there exists one problem. Note that the baseline g
has a positive value, i.e., our estimation result suggests an unrealistic loss function. Estimated
losses can be conﬁrmed in Figure 1.
Figure 1 is the replication of the estimated loss function whose shape depends on a and g.
The deduced shape suggests that the losses held by the CBR are greater when the output gap is
a positive. On the other hand, the losses from inﬂation seems to be almost symmetric since the
asymmetric parameter of inﬂation, a, approaches zero (a=,0.014).
The above suggests that the CBR is too conservative. Since the CBR resists the output
expansion excessively, it would like to tighten the monetary policy by increase the nominal
interest rate.
5 On the other hand, the CBR responds almost symmetrically toward inﬂation
deviation, as is the case under the Taylor rule.
However, the CBR has not adopted such a tight monetary policy. In almost all samples,
the instrument interest rate continues to decline in spite of the Russian economic expansion.
This contradicts our estimation result where g became positive.
What, then, is wrong in our estimation? Does there exist a more intuitive speciﬁcation for
the Russian monetary policy? We address these questions in the next section. The point to be
noted in the next section is whether or not the CBRʼs asymmetric preference, particularly for
output gap, g, is positive even when we consider the various economic conditions in Russia.
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [June 4
4 Intuitively, the coeﬃcient of the unemployment rate seems to be negative; further, g has an opposite sign.



















Notes: (i) The ﬁgures in parentheses denote standard errors.
*** denotes the signiﬁcance at the 1% level. (ii)
Parameters a and g are estimated by the delta method (see Greene (2007)). (iii) p represents the critical
value of Hansenʼs J test.
(0.134)



























We estimate two subsamples using two diﬀerent methods in order to obtain the robust
preference of the Russian monetary policy. First, we divide the sample data into two parts on
the basis of the policy characteristics of the CBRʼs chairmen. Second, we eliminate from the
entire sample the interval that is inﬂuenced by the 1998 crisis and then separately estimate the
ﬁrst and second parts. We demonstrate the robust preference of the CBR through subsample
estimation.
1. Successive Chairmen of the CBR and the Corresponding Economic Situations
Our sample includes the previous three (as of February 2009) chairmen of the CBR:
・Dubinin S.K.: from November 22, 1995, to September 11, 1998;
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FIG.1 . A SYMMETRIC LOSS (BASELINE ESTIMATION)
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Quadratic・Gerashchenko V.V.: from September 11, 1998, to March 22, 2002; and
・Ignatiev S.M.: from March 22, 2002, to the present.
In order to investigate the Russian monetary policy stance vis-a-vis the CBR chairmanship and
the economic situation, we divide the entire sample into two parts. The ﬁrst part, which is
termed Era 1, includes data from the Dubinin and Gerashchenko era. This part corresponds to
sample data from April 1997 to March 2002. The second part, which we term “Era 2,”
corresponds to sample data from April 2002 to July 2007.
Dubinin preferred economic growth over inﬂation stabilization, and therefore, did not
tighten the monetary policy until the beginning of the ruble depreciation in late 1997.
Gerashchenko was appointed as the chairman after the 1998 ruble collapse. In general, he
contributed to the economic recovery after the crisis, but he approved of the double-digit
inﬂation in order to stabilize the exchange rate after the crisis. Both these chairmen adopted
adverse monetary policies with regard to the price stability. On the other hand, Ignatiev earned
the trust of the government and the markets as a result of his ﬁnancial market reforms and
currency liberalization. His monetary policy has been sustained by a very stable economic
situation, as represented by high oil prices and the gentle dynamics of the exchange rate (the
political situation has also been stable). For these reasons, we diﬀerentiate the Ignatiev era from
those of the other two chairmen.
The estimated results are reported in Table 2. Not surprisingly, the result for Era 1 is
identical to that of the baseline sample. Therefore, in our estimation for Era 1, much like in our
estimation for the baseline sample, the problematic parameter g remains positive and a
approaches zero. On the other hand, the results for Era 2 are considerably diﬀerent from those
for Era 1 (as well for the entire sample), especially with regard to the sign of g. A negative g
indicates that the nonlinear rule can describe the Russian monetary policy in Era 2. It is


















Notes:( i)T h eﬁgures in parentheses denote standard errors.
*** denotes the signiﬁcance at the 1% level;
** Idem.,
5%. (ii) Parameters a and g are estimated by employing the delta method. (iii) p represents the critical

























anoteworthy that the result of Era 2 is supported by the favorable economic situation. Therefore,
the negative (expansionary) preference in Era 2 seems to imply the ordinary monetary policy
stance in Russia.
We summarize these results as follows:
1. The estimation results for Era 1 are identical to those for the entire sample: g is
positive, and a approaches zero.
2. The estimation results for Era 2 are able to describe the Russian monetary policy: g is
negative.
These results conﬁrm that the baseline model captures the real monetary policy behavior
of the CBR under Ignatiev. However, one issue still remains. Why did our baseline model fail
to capture the CBRʼs monetary policy in Era 1?
In fact, both the baseline and Era 1 include the eﬀect of the 1998 crisis. The 1998 crisis
destroyed the Russian economy and made the economic variables extremely volatile. It is
probable that the estimation result in Era 1 is distorted by the ﬁnancial crisis because, in reality,
Dubinin and Gerashchenko seemed to favor ﬁnancial expansion more than Ignatiev did. The
interest rate response in the crisis may aﬀect the former subsample estimation and therefore, the
preferences of the former chairmen exhibit a positive sign.
Moreover, almost all the results indicate that the asymmetric parameter of inﬂation a
approaches zero. We consider this and specify our baseline model as the real Russian monetary
policy rule.
2. Financial Crisis in 1998 and Its Eﬀects
(1) Brief Background
The Russian ﬁnancial crisis occurred in 1998 and was a product of the low oil prices in
the world market and the fallout of the Asian crisis. Lack of conﬁdence in the emerging
markets spilled over from Thailand into Russia, and the ruble depreciated drastically.
The CBR hiked the interest rate to prevent currency devaluation: however, the CBR was
unable to continue this policy since the Gosudarstvennoye Kratkosrochnoye Obyazatyelstvo
(Russian for “Government Short-Term Commitments;” henceforth, GKO) - Obligatsyi
Federalʼnovo Zaima (Russian for “Federal Loan Obligations;” henceforth, OFZ) (Treasury-Bill)
market was frozen. Fierce depreciation led to the collapse of the ﬁxed exchange rate and the
government decided to devalue the ruble. At the same time, the Russian government declared a
temporal moratorium on treasury bills and defaulted on its obligations to enterprises by 90
days.
This crisis destroyed the domestic T-Bill market and hence, the Russian monetary policy
became impotent for a certain period of time. Therefore, in sum, it can be said that the 1998
ﬁnancial crisis temporally confused the Russian ﬁnancial market and the monetary policy,
though this eﬀect was not long-lasting. Further, nobody expected the Russian economy to
recover shortly after the crisis.
(2) Speciﬁcation and Estimation
For almost all estimations, a approaches zero. Therefore, it seems that the CBR has no
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This loss function is biased only with regard to the output gap. Computing the above in the













This speciﬁcation implies that the CBR reacts linearly (i.e., symmetrically) with regard to
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FIG.2 . E FFECT OF THE 1998 FINANCIAL CRISIS













Notes: The shaded box denotes the effects of the 1998 crisis.inﬂation, but asymmetrically with reagrd to the output gap.
In this speciﬁcation, we can identify the average inﬂation bias that arose from the
asymmetric preference with regard to the output gap. The diﬀerence in the traditional inﬂation
bias represented in Kydland and Prescott (1977)or Barro and Gordon (1983)is that the average
inﬂation bias does not arise due to the central bankerʼs incentive to expand the potential output
but arises because of his asymmetric preference with regard to the output gap.
6 Additionally,
we exclude the data belonging to the period from May 1998 to May 1999 in order to consider
the eﬀects of the 1998 crisis.
The rationale for this separation is that the CBR reduced the reﬁnancing rate from 150%
in May 1998 to 60% in the following month; the rate stayed at the same level until May 1999.
On the other hand, the Russian output gap continued to exhibit a negative value during this
interval (see Figure 2). In the context of asymmetric preference, the following hypothesis arises:
Was positive g an outcome of the CBR’s acceptance of a negative output gap during the
1998 crisis?
The CBRʼs acceptance of a negative output gap during the 1998 crisis resulted in a positive g.
However, some changes do occur in the estimation after the volatile samples are eliminated.
In order to examine this hypothesis, we ﬁrst estimate the speciﬁc model (7)for the full
samples and then, for the two subsamples. We add the following instruments to the lags of
regressors in the estimation: three lags of government claim, three lags of interbank rate, two
lags of M1, two lags of domestic claim, two lags of export to the CIS countries, two lags of
real exchange rate, and two lags of real trade.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3. The results of the full sample are identical
to that of the baseline estimation. All coeﬃcients are the same as in the baseline model. Note
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Notes: (i)The ﬁgures in parentheses are standard errors.
*** denotes the signiﬁcance at the 1% level;
** Idem., 5%.
(ii)Parameters a and g are estimated by the delta method. (iii) p represents the critical value of HansenʼsJ
test. (iv)“Before crisis” corresponds to the period from April 1997 to April 1998 and “After crisis,” that





























athat even in this speciﬁcation, g is positive for the full sample that includes the 1998 crisis. On
the other hand, note that g is negative for both subsamples. These results suggest that the crisis
aﬀected the non-intuitive results in the previous estimations. The CBR accepted the negative
output gap during the 1998 crisis: this extremely tolerant behavior led to a positive g.
It is true that the GMM estimator has a large bias when it comes to a small sample
estimation: however, the results in section 2 support these results. Whereas in Era 1, g is
positive, in Era 2, it is a negative. Era 1 includes the eﬀects of the crisis and Era 2 does not.
On the basis of all the above estimations, we are able to demonstrate that the nonlinear interest
rule can describe Russian monetary policy behavior.
We summarize the results as follows:
1. In the Russian monetary policy, the interest rate rule is characterized by nonlinearity.
2. When the 1998 crisis is taken into account, we ﬁnd that the CBR usually prefers
output expansion since the asymmetric parameter of output gap g is negative.
The above results suggest that the nonlinear interest rate rule is able to explain the Russian
monetary policy, which leads to relatively higher inﬂation.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper aimed to estimate the interest rate rule for the Russian monetary policy as there
has been no successful report with regard to the estimation of an interest rate rule for Russia.
Instead of a quadratic loss function, we adopted the linex loss function, which is able to
express the central bankerʼs preference with regard to inﬂation and output gap. Considering the
low independence of the CBR and the volatility in Russiaʼsi n ﬂation and output, it seems that
the CBRʼs preferences with regard to inﬂation and/or output gap are asymmetric.
Although the nonlinear rule is strongly supported for both the inﬂation and output gap in
the full sample estimation, the asymmetric parameter of the output gap g is unreal. If CBR had
such a preference, it would react strongly to Russian economic expansion. However, such
behavior has not been observed in our samples except for during the 1998 ﬁnancial crisis.
Therefore, the subsamples were estimated in two diﬀerent ways: One subsample was
estimated on the basis of the characteristics of the CBR chairmen, while the other was
estimated excluding the eﬀects of the 1998 crisis. On the basis of these estimations, the robust
preference of the Russian monetary policy with regard to output were obtained̶the CBR
prefers output expansion. According to Surico (2007), this leads to a rise in inﬂation. This
conclusion coincides with the observations made with regard to the Russian monetary policy.
This paper provided a new possibility for the Russian monetary policy rule. However,
some issues still remain: the true economic structure of Russia and the reason why the CBR has
an asymmetric loss function are yet to be ascertained. In order to solve these questions, further
theoretical and empirical studies are needed.
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